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Truth and Method, second, revised edition, Hans-Georg Gadamer, 
Translation revised by Joel Weinshcimer and Donald Marshall, (New 
York: Crossroad Publishers, 1989), pp.xxxviii + 594. Reviewed by Ted 
Vaggalis, University of Kansas. 
Truth and Method by H.-G. Gadamer is one of the great works in 
contemporary continental philosophy. However its importance has only 
recently begun to be widely appreciated by the American philosophical 
community. Its slow reception has been due primarily to its initial English 
translation, which was so poorly done that it contributed to frequent 
misunderstandings of Gadamer's work. This second edition, edited and 
revised by Joel Weinsheimer and Donald Marshall, is a welcome event 
that finally provides an accurate access to H.-G. Gadamer's magnum opus. 
Not only has the translation been cleaned up and made coherent, footnotes 
have been updated and new ones added that refer the reader to recent books 
and articles, by the author and others, that bear on the issues at hand. 
Gadamer himself has gone over the translation and added points of 
clarification as well, (xviii) Also, Weinsheimer and Marshall have 
written a brief preface that explains many of the key German words and 
concepts crucial for understanding Gadamer's analyses, (xi—xix) On the 
whole, this is a more critical translation that enables one to see how well 
Gadamer's account of philosophical hermeneutics has held up over the 
years since its publication in 1960. 
The new edition of Truth and Method is an excellent opportunity for 
recalling the book's overall argument. Perhaps the best place to start is 
with the correction of a common misunderstanding of Gadamer's project. 
Some have taken him to be denying that the methods of the natural 
sciences are an appropriate avenue to truth. They see Gadamer arguing for 
a new philosophical method based on the peculiar subject-matter of the 
human sciences, (xxvii—xxvix) While Gadamer does argue against the 
universal claims of scientific method, he has made it quite clear that he is 
not interested in setting out a rival conception of method, (xxviii) Instead 
Gadamer is concerned with clarifying the conditions in which 
understanding occurs. These conditions are such that they exceed the 
narrow constraints set by scientific method, (xxi) Accordingly the book is 
concerned with an analysis of how truth is communicated in the experiences 
of art and the study of history. Here we are confronted with the 
inadequacy of science to provide us with any understanding of the meaning 
of these experiences. Hence Gadamer does not contest the validity of 
scientific method within its own domain. It is only when it exceeds its 
limits and claims an authority over that which it cannot understand that 
Gadamer is critical of the methods of the natural sciences. 
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The following investigations start with the resistance in 
modern science itself to the universal claim of scientific 
method. They are concerned to seek the experience of 
truth that transcends the domain of scientific method 
wherever that experience is to be found, and to inquire 
into its legitimacy. Hence the human sciences are 
connected to modes of experience that lie outside science: 
with the experiences of philosophy, of art, and of history 
itself. These are all modes of experience in which a truth 
is communicated that cannot be verified by the 
methodological means proper to science, (xxii) 
Gadamer begins with a consideration of how truth is experienced 
through the work of art. Art represents an important place in Gadamer's 
work. It allows one to see clearly the role that philosophical hermeneutics 
plays in all understanding. Traditionally art was not considered to have 
any significance in terms of truth. Modernity has viewed the history of 
art, from the time of Plato down to the present, as primarily an emotive 
experience that was outside the domain of truth. This view reached its 
zenith in Kant's Critique of Judgment. In Kant art undergoes a 
subjectivization that denies it the capacity to generate meaning and 
transmit knowledge. 
In his critique of aesthetic judgment what Kant sought to 
and did legitimate was the subjective universality of 
aesthetic taste in which there is no longer any knowledge 
of the object, and in the area of the "fine arts" the 
superiority of genius to any aesthetics based on rules 
The radical subjectivization involved in Kant's new way 
of grounding aesthetics was truly epoch-making. In 
discrediting any kind of theoretical knowledge except 
that of natural science, it compelled the human sciences 
to rely on the methodology of the natural sciences in 
conceptualizing themselves. But it made this reliance 
easier by offering the "artistic element," "feeling," and 
"empathy" as subsidiary elements. (41) 
The final phase of Kant's critical project, then, was to legitimate 
aesthetic judgments and judgments of taste. In order to do so, he had to 
solve a perplexing feature of those judgments. They have the curious 
feature of being both subjective in origin and universal in scope. It is here 
that Kant aligns himself with the dominant philosophical view of art 
that holds that the work of art does not have any truth value. The result 
is to produce an alienated conception of art: the "museum" conception that 
requires one to abstract the work of art from its original world and see it 
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merely as an object that produces reflective pleasure for a spectator (xxx— 
xxxi) What Gadamer finds problematic here is Kant's dependence on the 
methodological presuppositions of the natural sciences. This requires the 
separation of the spectator from the work of art that is referred to as 
"aesthetic differentiation." Thus the spectator and the work must be 
abstracted from all their contingent features in order to arrive at the 
intended reflective pleasure. 
However such a conception of art is simply inadequate. An ancient 
image of the gods that was displayed in a temple was not intended to 
produce pleasure in a spectator. Even though it stands in a museum, torn 
from its original setting, the world in which it was formed still is a part of 
it and our understanding of it. (xxxi) Thus a hermeneutic understanding is 
based on an "aesthetic non-differentiation" where the spectator integrates 
the work of art into the totality of her self-understanding, (xxx) This 
process of integration is accomplished when the spectator engages in the 
play that constitutes the understanding of a work of art. Play is not the 
subjective attitude of a player (or spectator), but it is the event that draws 
the spectator into the movement of understanding the work of art, engulfing 
both as participants and transforming them into a meaningful, structural 
whole. (117) Thus to truly experience the work of art one must put aside the 
presuppositions required by a view like Kant's. 
We started by saying that the true being of the spectator, 
who belongs to the play of art, cannot be adequately 
understood in terms of subjectivity, as a way that 
aesthetic consciousness conducts itself. But this does not 
mean that the nature of the spectator cannot be described 
in terms of being present at something, in the way we 
pointed out. Considered as a subjective accomplishment, 
being present has the character of being outside oneself.... 
In fact being outside oneself is the positive possibility of 
being wholly with something else. This kind of being 
present is a self-forgetfulness, and to be a spectator 
consists in giving oneself in self-forgetfulness to what one 
is watching. (125—6) 
The result of this transformation into structure is that the work of art 
acquires a contemporaneity that enables its meaning to transcend the 
horizon of its original setting while maintaining its truth. (121) Truth in 
the work of art is that content which is able to find presentation down 
through time, this is the work's continuity. (121) It is this continuity that 
opens the work of art up to the spectator, regardless of temporal setting, 
and allows the truth of the work to address her. 
The point of Gadamer's analysis of the experience of art is to enable 
him to critique the concern with method that has plagued the human 
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sciences since their inception and formation in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. Now this concern with method had taken two forms 
in Europe. The first is the attempt to base the human sciences on the logic 
of the natural sciences, which had its origins in works like Hume's Treatise 
of Human Nature and Mill's System of Logic. (3—4) The second is the 
romantic tradition that had its roots in Herder, Rousseau and Kant. Here 
one finds the rejection of the natural sciences as the basis of the human 
sciences, in favor of a more historical way of viewing the human condition. 
However Gadamer argues that underlying both conceptions of the human 
sciences is the Cartesian subjectivism of modern thought that gave rise to 
an alienated form of historical consciousness. (271) The irony is that 
romanticism found itself dependent on the presuppositions of a scientific 
method that it rejected in regard to the human sciences. (6—8) 
The goal of such leading figures as Schleiermacher, Ranke and 
Dilthey was to provide the human sciences with a method that would 
make them as reliable as the natural sciences. The problem was in 
accounting for the peculiar subject matter of the human sciences. The 
concern of these disciplines was not to be predictive like the natural 
sciences. Rather their aim was to explain the uniqueness of the event or 
text in question. The human sciences took as their guide Kant's claims about 
aesthetic judgments and his requirement that the spectator free herself 
from all subjective influences, which gave an aesthetic dimension to the 
methods of the human sciences. 
However, in spite of this rejection of Enlightenment valuations, the 
romantic conception of the human sciences found itself unable to resist the 
methodological prejudices underlying the model of the natural sciences due 
to its Kantian orientation. According to Gadamer, the result was that the 
Romanticist movement of nineteenth-century Germany turned into a reverse 
Enlightenment that viewed history in terms of a fall from a golden age, 
like that of Greek culture in the time of Plato and Aristotle. (273—274) It 
reveals that the scientific inquiry characteristic of the Enlightenment and 
the rejection of that form of inquiry characteristic of the romantic 
movement in Germany are really grounded in the same presuppositions, the 
Cartesian demand that the investigator free herself from all subjective 
prejudices. These two accounts of method just go about this so-called 
liberation in different ways. Thus the Cartesian notion of subjectivity and 
the demand that the investigator free herself from all prejudice functions 
as a hidden methodological prejudice that distorts the experience of 
history. The result is that this form of historical consciousness is alienated 
from its subject matter in much the same way as the aesthetic consciousness 
of Kant. 
Thus the criteria of the modern Enlightenment still 
determine the self-understanding of historicism. They do 
not do so directly, but through a curious refraction caused 
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by romanticism. This can be seen with particular clarity 
in the fundamental schema of the philosophy of history 
that romanticism shares with the Enlightenment and 
that precisely through the romantic reaction to the 
Enlightenment became an unshakable premise : the 
schema of the conquest of mythos by logos. What gives 
this schema its validity is the presupposition of the 
progressive retreat of magic in the world. It is supposed 
to represent progress in the history of the mind, and 
precisely because romanticism disparages this 
development, it takes over the schema itself as a self-
evident truth. It shares the presupposition of the 
Enlightenment and only reverses its values, seeking to 
establish the validity of what is old simply on the fact 
that it is old.... (273) 
In order to liberate the tradition of the human sciences from the 
misunderstanding caused by this Cartesian prejudice, Gadamer focuses on a 
distinction between two types of experience, that of the notion of Erlebnis 
and that of the notion of Erfahrung. ( See pp. 60—70; 164—169; 346—379) 
Erlebnis connotes the singular and unrepeatable aspects of one's experience. 
It was this notion that guided the researches of Schleiermacher and 
Dilthey. Their emphasis was on capturing the uniqueness of a person's 
psychic structure which gave meaning to that person's life as a whole. 
This requires the investigator to free herself from any and all traditional 
presuppositions in order to accurately reconstruct the original setting of the 
object under study. The problem was that Erlebnis, as a subjectivist 
conception of understanding, led its proponents into all of the 
epistemological difficulties attached to this notion. The methodological 
demand that the investigator free herself from all prejudice covers over 
the historicizing effect that the past has on the investigator. The 
investigator must dismiss those very preconceptions given by tradition that 
has enabled the event to endure through time and made it meaningful. 
Thus the object of historical investigation is supposedly brought to light in 
terms of a reconstruction of its original setting in order to produce its 
original meaning. But in doing this one is mistaking one's reconstruction for 
the original. (167) The result is the same as the museum mentality found in 
the Kantian notion of "aesthetic differentiation." The investigator has 
delivered only a dead meaning which may arouse our curiosity, but it can 
have no enduring significance for us in the present. (167) Gadamer refers us 
to Hegel's characterization of the effects of this conception of the human 
sciences. 
He [Hegell exhibits a clear grasp of the futility of 
restoration when he writes as follows of the decline of 
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the classical world and its "religion of art": the works of 
the Muses "are now what they are for us— beautiful 
fruits torn from the tree. A friendly fate presents them to 
us as a girl might offer those fruits. We have not the real 
life of their being— the tree that bore them, the earth 
and elements, the climate that constituted their 
substance, the seasonal changes that governed their 
growth. Nor does fate give us, with those works of art 
their world, the spring and summer of the moral life in 
which they bloomed and ripened but only the veiled 
memory of this reality." And he calls the relationship of 
posterity to those works of art that have been handed 
down an "external activity" that "wipes spots of rain or 
dust from this fruit and instead of the internal elements 
of the surrounding, productive, and lifegiving reality of 
the moral world, it substitutes the elaborate structure of 
the dead elements of its external existence, of language, 
of its historical features and so forth. And this not in 
order to live within that reality but merely to represent 
it within oneself." (167) 
Gadamer argues that the only sure path open to the human sciences is 
the conception of experience offered by Hegel. This is found in the notion of 
Erfahrung. Like the earlier analysis of the experience of art, experience 
must be construed in terms of integration. But it can be carried out only if 
the investigator is caught up in the play through which one comes to know 
the past. The primary task of the human sciences is to carry out a 
thoughtful mediation of the past with contemporary life. (168) This task 
is not to be conducted in terms of the self-forgetfulness characteristic of 
methodological consciousness in which the investigator suppresses her own 
presuppositions in order to purely experience the past. Instead it represents 
the continuing significance of the past for present-day life. This is what 
Hegel characterized as a thinking relation to the past. (167) It is also 
consistent with what we found to be the case in regard to the truth of art. 
However if we are to follow Hegel in our characterization of the human 
sciences does this not lead us to his philosophy of absolute spirit? (341) To 
do so would be to undermine all that Gadamer had argued for in regard to 
the finitude of our experience which prevents any totalization of the 
meaning of history and art. 
Gadamer claims that to accept Hegel's conception of experience does 
not commit one to an absolute philosophy of spirit (Geist). Erfahrung is not 
to be understood in its traditional sense where it is related to a scientific 
knowing which seeks for a completion of knowledge. Rather Gadamer 
takes us in the direction of a conception of experience that is constantly 
exposing one to the limits of what can be known. It is the experience of one's 
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finitude. (356—357) The totality of meaning that constitutes the past at 
any given time is always going on beyond us and confronts us with the 
constant task of deepening our understanding of the relation between past 
and present. For this reason there can be no attempt at a totalization of 
knowledge. Nor is it possible to make a closure of history. The 
hermeneutical human sciences seek to understand in the manner of 
integrating (or fusing) the horizons of past and present in such a way that 
the meaning of the events depicted, or the text being examined, may be 
preserved and delivered over for future understanding. 
It is at this point that we can see most clearly how dependent Gadamer 
is on Heidegger's analytic of Dasein. Heidegger's analysis revealed the 
underlying presuppositions of Greek substance ontology that led to the 
dominance of scientific method and the conception of absolute knowledge in 
Hegel. (270) In addition, Heidegger's work showed that the historical 
knowledge of the human sciences could not be harmonized with a 
methodological consciousness that ignored these presuppositions. (271) It is 
the dependence of the human sciences on the investigator's awareness of 
her 'fore-conceptions' that gives the human sciences their true focus. In 
bringing the prejudices of the investigator back into play, the circular 
structure of all understanding is brought clearly into view. 
The circle, then, is not formal in nature. It is neither 
subjective nor objective, but describes understanding as the 
interplay of the movement of tradition and the movement 
of the interpreter. The anticipation of meaning that 
governs our understanding of a text is not an act of 
subjectivity, but proceeds from the commonality that 
binds us to tradition. But this commonality is constantly 
being formed in our relation to tradition. Tradition is not 
simply a permanent precondition; rather we produce it 
ourselves inasmuch as we understand, participate in the 
evolution of tradition, and hence further determine it 
ourselves. Thus the circle of understanding is not a 
"methodological" circle, but describes an element of the 
ontological structure of understanding. (293) 
Gadamer's appropriation of Heidegger's work brings to light the true 
task of the human sciences. They are no longer concerned with securing the 
individuality and psychical life of an author against the prejudices of 
tradition. But the focus is squarely on the truth of what is said in a text, or 
depicted in an event, and how its transmission through time has effected 
our understanding of ourselves and the past. (297) Time has generally been 
regarded as the force that has brought about an alienation between past 
and present which has stood in the way of understanding. In Gadamer's 
work, temporality is now the element in which understanding is achieved. 
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It constitutes a play of past and present in which the truth of the event or 
text being investigated is allowed to distinguish itself from mere prejudice. 
'Time is no longer a gulf to be bridged because it separates; it is actually 
the supportive ground of the course of events in which the present is 
rooted." (297) 
The role of tradition and prejudice in Truth and Method is one of the 
most controversial claims in the book. Critics, like Habermas, question 
whether the hermeneutic dimensions of understanding provide a sufficient 
basis for critically assessing the claims of tradition. The problem is that a 
hermeneutical conception of the human sciences not only fuses past and 
present, but seems to confuse them; and it does so in a fairly conservative 
and unreflective manner. Philosophical hermeneutics appears to lack any 
critical or transcendent feature that can tell us what is wrong with 
tradition. 
But such a view misses the significance of Gadamer's hermeneutical 
stance. Its task is not to simply reappropriate the past, but to continually 
call into question the reliability of both its own presuppositions and that of 
the texts or events under scrutiny. The play of understanding that involves 
both text and investigator constitutes a logical structure where prejudices 
are put at risk; as both text and fore-conception, past and present are 
measured against one another through the activity of questioning. (299) To 
take up the position of a transcendent or objectivist form of critique is to 
somehow safeguard certain values in an attempt at planning or managing 
discourse. But these values must be subjected to a historical questioning in 
which they prove their continuing validity. Hermeneutics is always on 
guard against the dangers of a scientific reason which attempts to 
administer a set of universal values which would then arbitrarily close off 
the play of understanding. 
Does not the universality of understanding involve a one-
sidedness in its contents, since it lacks a critical principle 
in relation to tradition and, as it were, espouses a 
universal optimism? However much it is the nature of 
tradition to exist only through being appropriated, it 
still is part of the nature of man to be able to break with 
tradition, to criticize and dissolve it, and is not what 
takes place in remaking the real into an instrument of 
human purpose something far more basic in our 
relationship to being?... Understanding certainly does 
not mean merely appropriating customary opinions or 
acknowledging what tradition has sanctified.... It seems 
to me, however, that the one-sidedness of hermeneutic 
universalism has the truth of a corrective. It enlightens 
the modern viewpoint based on making, producing, and 
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constructing concerning the necessary conditions to which 
that viewpoint is subject, (xxxvii—xxxviii) 
The activity of questioning, fundamental to hermeneutics, shows that 
in all understanding some notion of application is being made. Traditional 
hermeneutics viewed its task only in terms of explicating texts. But 
Gadamer shows that all understanding is also an application and not 
merely an interpretation. Hermeneutic understanding is a matter of 
determining the efficacy of the text such that its binding character is made 
manifest through the work of an investigator. Therefore in addition to 
interpretation, the investigator must apply what is said to her own 
situation in order to attain that vision that truly discloses the full range of 
meanings of a text. 
Transposing ourselves consists neither in the empathy of 
one individual for another nor in subordinating another 
person to our own standards; rather, it always involves 
rising to a higher universality that overcomes not only 
our own particularity but also that of the other. The 
concept of "horizon" suggests itself because it expresses 
the superior breadth of vision that the person who is 
trying to understand must have. To acquire a horizon 
means that one learns to look beyond what is close at 
hand—not in order to look away from it but to see it 
better, within a larger whole and in truer 
proportion We have already pointed out that a truly 
historical consciousness always sees its own present in 
such a way that it sees itself, as well as the historically 
other, within the right relationships. (305) 
The concept of experience as an integration of past and present, along 
with the dimension of application, brings us to a consideration of 
Gadamer's conception of language. This constitutes the final section of the 
book. Gadamer claims that language cannot be reduced to features like 
lexicons and grammars. (463) It is not a tool that one can use in order to 
discover or construct meaning, or give one the results one wants. Instead 
language has the structure of dialogue which binds its participants to one 
another. Here we see that genuine understanding is not a technique that 
enables one to control and manipulate the course of conversation. Rather 
dialogue is an event that places one's views at risk. It remains outside the 
control of either party involved, requiring them to trust in the justice of 
what is said. (383) Thus language is a play that draws the participants 
into it in order to turn their exchange of views into a meaningful whole. 
(457) In the process of exposing our views to the risk of this play we come 
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up against the limits that reveal our finitude. We are able to see that 
language both determines and is determined by us. 
...it must be emphasized that language has its true being 
only in dialogue, in coming to an understanding. This is 
not to be understood as if that were the purpose of 
language. Coming to an understanding is not a mere 
action, a purposeful activity, a setting up of signs through 
which 1 transmit my will to others. Coming to an 
understanding as such, rather, does not need any tools, in 
the proper sense of the word.... But human language must 
be thought of as a special and unique life process since, in 
linguistic communication, "world" is disclosed. Reaching 
an understanding in language places a subject matter 
before those communicating like a disputed object set 
between them. Thus the world is the common ground, 
trodden by none and recognized by all, uniting all who 
talk to one another. All kinds of human community are 
kinds of linguistic community, even more, they form 
language. For language is by nature the language of 
conversation; it fully realizes itself only in the process of 
coming to an understanding. That is why it is not a mere 
means in that process. (446) 
Language then is the clearing through which the world is disclosed. 
From the standpoint of philosophical hermeneutics the world is not just a 
collection of objects to be described. It is a world in which one is involved 
and toward which one bears a specific orientation. (443) It is the place 
where one dwells. It is through an understanding of this orientation that 
one is able to determine the factualness of objects in the world. The play of 
language is not only a description of these objects. But it provides an 
account of the involvements and relations we bear to these things that 
allows the genuine facts of the matter to emerge. (443) From this 
perspective one can see that the scope of the methods of the natural 
sciences in capturing the essence of truth is too limited. Their objectivity 
does not exhaust the notion of factuality, especially as it is found in the 
experiences of art and the human sciences. (453) The significance of the 
world is not exhausted in enumerating what is present-at-hand, nor in 
determining that which can be measured or calculated. Instead our notion 
of what is significant needs to be enlarged to include the work achieved in 
the human sciences so that the totality of the world can find expression. 
(456) 
Here we uncover the speculative dimension that language has in its 
articulation of the world. In language one possesses the power "to hold 
what is said together with an infinity of what is not said" and to insure its 
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understanding. (469) It is this capacity to bring out the infinity of meaning 
in the finite word that is the ultimate accomplishment of philosophical 
hermeneutics. But this can only come about when we allow ourselves to be 
addressed by tradition. Through our mediation with the past we find a 
transformation occurring which not only reveals our prejudices, but allows 
the subject matter to work itself out. (463—464) Through an exchange in 
which interpretations are asserted and rejected we are able to uncover the 
nature of the subject matter. (465) Thus as one statement balances another 
the result is that the word which we interpretively select to express 
meaning is able to do so in the sense that an infinity of meaning is captured 
in a finite word. (465) The notion that language is play then captures the 
essence of truth for Gadamer. Play takes seriously what is being asserted. 
As one plays with the expressive power of language one comes to realize 
the truth of a subject matter in this play which expresses an infinity of 
meaning in the finite word. (490) To say that one has understood is to 
realize that one has been drawn into the play of meaning. Truth is not the 
limited experience of a spectator who maintains a distance from the object 
under investigation in order to factually assess it. Rather truth occurs only 
when one has surrendered oneself to this play which uncovers an infinity of 
meanings and the web of relations that bind one to an object. (126) 
Gadamer's conception of truth and language was determined by his 
reading of the Platonic dialogues. (464) Socrates is successful because the 
young men who follow him do not hold themselves back like 
Thrasymachus. They eagerly engage themselves in the hunt for an answer 
to the questions posed by Socrates. In this way whatever is under discussion 
is able to achieve its full presence, however remote its origin or unclear its 
resolution may be. (127) Language as play, then, links that which is not 
concurrent with that which is present in such a way that the former can be 
experienced and taken seriously as a matter to be comprehended by someone 
who is present. (128) The truth of things is not to be found in the flattened 
projections that appear in scientific discourse. Truth emerges in a play that 
makes what is in dispute alive and vibrant for the participants. 
This characterization of truth as the result of the play of language is 
bound to be unsatisfactory to those in the analytic tradition. For them, 
Gadamer's work will appear to be just more of the continental obscurantistic 
philosophy that has marked this tradition throughout the twentieth 
century. Admittedly there is some justice in this charge. The discussion of 
truth that emerges here is very different from the one that is found in 
philosophy of science. It seems so vague and indefinite that it easily finds 
itself faced with charges of relativism. However Gadamer regards this 
vagueness as the strength of his work in Truth and Method. Clearly a 
hermeneutical approach is not license to read a text or event in the way 
that one wants. Gadamer is emphatic that a text has a definite meaning. 
It is just that the play of this meaning is an infinite one that is constantly 
exposed to new horizons of meaning through language and time. This 
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infinity of meaning is best expressed through a philosophical hermeneutics 
that constantly exposes the productive possibilities of the presuppositions 
that an investigator brings to the event of understanding. 
This brings us to a consideration of how well Gadamer's account of 
philosophical hermeneutics has held up over the years since its 
publication in 1960. I think that upon reflection one will see that the 
account he has given us has held up well. It was written at a time when 
logical positivism was the dominant school in American philosophical 
circles. Soon after Gadamer's work appeared, Kuhn and Feyerabend 
published their accounts critical of the positivist conception of scientific 
method. Truth and Method has been equally influential in debates about 
the logical status of historical explanations and the social sciences. Since 
this time hermeneutics has played a central role in these debates on 
method. In both the natural and social sciences the crucial issue is the 
concern that the methodological demands of scientific explanation are too 
narrow to account for the way in which understanding occurs in these 
domains. Social scientists in particular have found an ally in Gadamer's 
work. There is no question that Gadamer's work has become even more 
timely in recent years. Of course hermeneutics has had its most lasting 
impact in the fields of aesthetic theory and literary criticism. But the 
most promising area for applying philosophical hermeneutics is in that of 
ethics and political philosophy. Recent works like Alasdair Maclntyre's 
After Virtue have raised anew the possibility of a return to an Aristotelian 
conception of ethics, an issue that Gadamer addressed at the beginning of 
his career and which continues to hold an important place in his work. 
Truth and Method is one of those rare works which becomes more 
relevant as the years pass. One can find in it an inexhaustible store of 
knowledge. In these days when historical knowledge is viewed as an 
obstacle to progress, Gadamer's book is an important reminder of the 
dangers that confront the human condition when it has not adequately 
reflected on the meaning of its past. I hope that readers of this review will 
take the time to read Gadamer's Truth and Method for they will never be 
the same after this experience. 
Sartre's Political Theory, by William L. McBride. Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press. Reviewed by Julie C. Pedersen, Loyola University of 
Chicago. 
To those familiar with Sartre's philosophical and literary works, the 
title of William L. McBride's new book, Sartre's Political Theory, may 
evoke a cautious if not justified skepticism. While Sartre's work surely 
addresses itself to questions of political significance, the notion of Sartre as 
a "political theorist" is somewhat paradoxical: is not Sartre the 
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philosopher whose radical idea of individual freedom helped fuel an 
existentialism which rejected theism and humanism in favor of a norma-
tive yet pernicious anarchism? While the question of Sartre's commitment 
to this idea of freedom continues to divide scholars, one doubts whether 
any tenable political theory can support the notion of individual freedom 
for which Sartre is so celebrated. 
It is with full knowledge of the task before him that McBride 
endeavors to "reconstruct some of the main moments in the evolution of 
Sartre's political theory" (p. 85). The term "political theory" is of course a 
label, but it is not the pedantic concern to fit Sartre into a category that 
drives McBride's thesis. On the contrary, this book explores the full range 
of Sartre's thoughts on society, history and politics—thoughts scattered 
across dozens of works, innumerable pages and nearly half a century-and 
attempts to show how that thought emerges out of and remains forever 
faithful to the twin ideals of socialism (understood in a highly specified 
sense) and freedom. 
McBride begins his task with a "situational biography" of Sartre's 
early life and young manhood. We learn, among other things, of the 
solitude of Sartre's childhood and of the alienation and violence that 
circumscribed his adolescent years away from Paris. Although the 
inclusion of so much biographical information may lead certain readers to 
reductionist conclusions, McBride overtly rejects such conclusions seeking 
instead to illuminate the force of circumstances without giving to those cir-
cumstances the power of any determinism. 
What emerges from this biographical sketch is a portrait of an 
individual whose early experiences can be characterized by a lack of 
varied or significant social relations and of a philosopher entrenched in a 
political slumber out of which not even the spectacle of the Liberation of 
Paris would fully wake him. The extent of this political slumber is 
nowhere more apparent than in the stark contrast between the 
sociopolitical events which shaped the daily life of a continent ravaged 
by war, and the abstract, pedagogical, apolitical "monument of 
rationality" to which Sartre gave the title Being and Nothingnessess. 
Written during our century's darkest hours, Being and Nothingness 
reflects astonishingly little of the monstruous political climate of the 
world in which its author lived. With brief exceptions—most notably 
Sartre's famous promise of an ethics in its closing passages—this 
metaphysical tour de force remains, as McBride acknowledges, far removed 
from "anything recognizably political" (p. 36). But if Being and 
Nothingness was written in a sociopolitical vacuum, the same cannot be 
said of the publications that emerged from Sartre's post-war pen. 
In the middle chapters of his book, McBride takes the reader on a 
guided tour of these publications. Along the way, we encounter both the 
well-known works (Anti-Semite and Jew, or the essays "Materialism and 
Revolution" and "What is Literature"), as well as the more obscure pieces, 
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(the introduction Sartre wrote to the preface of Louis Dalmas's Le 
Communisme yougoslave, his work L'Affaire Henri Martin, and the series 
of articles grouped under the heading The Communists and Peace). 
Particular attention is also given to the Cahiers pour une morale, a work 
which Sartre regarded as problematic and unsatisfactory, but one which 
contains, according to McBride, Sartre's attempt at making good on his 
promise to deliver an ethics. 
Not surprisingly, this journey through Sartre's political awakening 
leads directly, if not a little too patiently, to a consideration of the two 
volumes of the Critique of Dialectical Reason, and of its introductory essay 
"Search for a Method". If the writings of the post-war years contain 
glimmers of an emerging, albeit inchoate political theory, it is in the 
Critique, particularly in subsection A of Book 2 that we find "the heart of 
Sartre's political theory" (p. 141). 
Both its official title, Critique of Dialectical Reason, as well as its 
subtitle, "Theory of Practical Ensembles" bear witness to the sociopolitical 
nature of this work (a sharp contrast indeed to the virtually exclusive 
treatment of individual consciousness in Being and Nothingness1.). The 
former is no accidental pun on Kant's work, but rather a description of 
Sartre's deeply-rooted belief that nature, society and history are best 
understood dialectically. Indeed, we are urged to view the Critique as a 
quest to make history intelligible, and to appreciate the fact that Sartre, 
unlike Kant, Hegel, or even Marx, favors intelligibility over guidance and 
prediction. But it is the concern with "practical ensembles"—that is to say, 
with the emergence, formation and function of groups—which dominates 
the Critique; and it is the attempt, within its pages, to work out all the 
notorious difficulties between the individual and society that makes this 
work stand out among Sartre's other works, and that qualifies him, in the 
end, as a political theorist. 
What is the nature of the political theory which unfolds in light of 
the dialectics of existence? It is a theory which sees the human origin of 
all values and which therefore rejects a teleological view of history. It is 
a theory which remains committed to the notion of freedom as the supreme 
value of conscious Being, only now freedom is situated in the context of the 
lives of individuals who coexist in an increasingly global village. Indeed, 
the freedom of the pour-soi becomes now the freedom of group praxis, as 
individuals are united in their common struggle to eliminate scarcity. 
It is in the processes which circumscribe the formation of what Sartre 
calls "the fused group" that we best understand the other ideal upon which 
Sartre's thought rests and ultimately the relation between both freedom 
and socialism. It is in fact Sartre's growing understanding of the 
importance of one's place in sociopolitical history that ultimately guides 
his new conception of situated freedom. The lofty freedom of Being and 
Nothingness remains, in a sense, in the background; but before it can be 
realized a more basic freedom must first be won. It is the fight to secure 
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this freedom—played out on an infinite variety of battlefields ranging from 
real wars to tennis courts and boxing rings-that underlies all human action 
and that gives rise, slowly and dialectically, to the formation of groups. 
It is in the inherent power of the bonds that tie the group together, if 
only momentarily, that Sartre sees the sole promise for social change. But 
again, in contrast to his predecessors, Sartre's "vision" of the future is not 
fixed or determinate, except insofar as his conception of socialism entails 
"the suppression of exploitation and oppression" (p. 163). It is not 
therefore the quest to establish the ideal human community which defines 
Sartre's socialism, for it rejects the establishment of any new world order. 
If there is a call to action, it is an action which would lead to the 
elimination of societal structures and hierarchies. 
It is thus between these two pillars of Sartre's thought—socialism and 
freedom-that McBride constructs a political theory out of Sartre's many 
words. By the time he completes his journey through Sartre's thought-a 
journey which succeeds at establishing Sartre's direct, if not ironic 
relevance, to the sociopolitical events of our own decade, the reader 
acquires a new and broader, and ultimately more sympathetic knowledge of 
Sartre. Particular questions, such as Sartre's complicated relationship 
with Marxism over the years, are seen in light of Sartre's struggle toward 
mature political thought. Concepts such as "class struggle," "rights," "the 
state," "sovereignty," "institutions," to mention only a few, are imbued 
with a Sartrean meaning all their own. 
If naming Sartre's thought as "political theory" strikes some as too 
wide, it will no doubt strike others as too narrow. McBride's book is no mere 
compilation of Sartre's responses, over the years, to political events and 
ideologies both past and present (although this information is surely there 
for the interested reader). It is rather a philosophical offering, the 
resulting gift of which is a new, broader and ultimately more sympathetic 
image of Sartre, and of the philosopher embedded in the world. Perhaps in 
the end, one cannot avoid the question of whether McBride has made a 
political theory where before there was none. In the final analysis, the 
answer to this question will depend largely on the philosophical 
temperament of the reader and upon their ability to conceive and attach a 
new meaning to old words. 
Mind in Action: Essays in the Philosophy of Mind, by Amelie Oksenberg 
Rorty. Boston: Beacon Press, 1988. 378 pp. Reviewed by Andrew Pessin, 
Columbia University. 
In Mind in Action Amelie Rorty has assembled a variety of loosely 
related essays written by her over a period of fifteen years. These essays 
cover a wide range of subjects—personal identity, emotions, allegedly 
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irrational attitudes such as akrasia and self-deception, virtues, practical 
reasoning, etc.—and within most of these subjects she reviews, develops, 
and/or criticizes a wide range of views. The book's opening essay attempts, 
approximately, to provide some sort of framework for all this diversity; a 
daunting task, at which I'm not sure it succeeds. There's a lot here: of that, 
at least, I'm sure. 
Rorty begins with the question, "Is the philosophy of mind a subject?" 
What she means is that the issues encompassed are so varied, with so 
many threads leading back to so many different historical contexts, that 
it's quite hard to bring it all together. A brief historical review and her 
main themes are well established, viz. the diversity, and the con-
text-dependency, of all positions. 'The range of various 'mental' 
activities," she writes, "...must each find a place within some explanatory 
theory. But nothing ... requires that they all find their explanations in the 
same place" (p. 5). 
The essays in the first main division (of four) in the book, "Persons and 
Personae," focus largely on the nature of persons and personal identity. Her 
overall claim seems to be that there are many such conceptions, with each 
one sensitive to some particular social or political or just plain 
philosophical context. Augustine's religious concerns, e.g., flavored his 
conception of persons as simple unified agents despite their conflicting 
faculties; political concerns dominated the conceptions of persons of writers 
like Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau; and today's biomedical advances and 
concerns, I should add, certainly have ramifications for contemporary 
conceptions. But it's not just that there's diversity, etc.; the deeper point 
seems to be that sometimes or maybe often the conflicts between conceptions 
may be unresolvable. (More on this in a bit.) 
The essays in the second and third divisions, "Psychological 
Activities" and "The Wayward Mind," are the most interesting. Those in 
the second division seek to undermine the traditional distinctions among 
psychological faculties, presenting various psychological phenomena 
(love, jealousy, fear of death, self-knowledge) not as occurrent states with 
prepositional contents but as processes or activities which are cognitive, 
motivational, and affective, as well as socially influenced. The essays in 
the third division focus on various "anomalous" psychological activities, 
including self-deception, akrasia, the irrational conservation of the 
emotions, and agent regret-anomalous because of problems they cause for 
notions of rational agency. Rorty's main idea seems to be that once you 
relinquish traditional faculty distinctions and take her more 
"contextualized" approach, their mysteriousness disappears. 
Here's her own brief summary of this approach. It treats the various 
traditional cognitive and psychological attitudes as: 
1) Cross-classified with, rather than contrasted to, 
physical processes; 2) a) Heterogeneous classes with 
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disjunctive criteria for membership, b) Activities rather 
than states, c) Complex activities composed of 
distinctive subprocesses; 3) Actively interdependent and 
mutually constituting; 4) Partly indeterminate, open to 
further determination; 5) Organized in habitual or 
characteristic patterns; 6) Socially structured; 7) 
Multilayered and multifunctional, (p. 8) 
For details, and for her application of this approach to the anomalous 
activities above, I refer you to the text. 
The fourth, shortest division, "Community as the Context of 
Character," includes essays with a variety of tasks. The first analyzes the 
theory of action she finds implicit in recent moral theory. The last 
explores the idea that the range of a person's power is largely controlled by 
controlling her imagination, specifically her conception of what is 
possible. The two in between tackle the general problem of assuring the 
proper exercise of the various dispositions constituting the virtues, and, 
after criticizing the "master regulatory virtue" solution to this problem—in 
which, in order to resolve possible conflicts, one virtue is chosen to reign 
supreme—propose, ultimately, that the appropriate configuration of a 
person's virtues is determined by social and political institutions and 
interactions. 
Now here's a general criticism: Rorty's approach strikes me as often 
rather conciliatory. She tends to find some truth in most positions, even 
those most at odds. Examples abound: p. 43, synthesizing opposed 
conceptions of persons; p. 54, juggling contrasting criteria for identity; p. 311, 
balancing competing criteria for balancing opposed virtues. Now she may 
not be wrong to be conciliatory; perhaps there is some truth in most 
positions. But it's a criticism because it doesn't make for very exciting 
reading when almost everyone turns out to be at least a little right. 
It's worth noting, too, that Rorty's inclined towards a rather 
continental style. She observes, more than argues; she's prone to join 
metaphysical concerns with political; she leans towards the literary. 
Indeed, there's a near total absence in this book of perhaps the two most 
widely discussed topics in analytical philosophy of mind of the past two 
decades or so, viz. the problems of content and qualia. It's insightful to 
realize just how much issues of mind are entwined with those of ethics and 
politics, but this book is alot more about the latter than the former. As 
such its title is a bit misleading. That's not exactly a tragedy, but be 
warned. Philosophers' dollars want selective spending. 
Some good points of the book include its insightfulness, numerous 
interesting and provocative observations (especially about, e.g., various 
emotions like love and jealousy), and its literary flair (e.g., she crafts 
interesting brief anecdotes in a number of essays to serve as analytical 
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fodder). At its best moments in those middle two divisions it even recalls 
Proust. 
But there are some lesser moments as well. Insightfulness is sometimes 
tempered by conciliatoriness. Observations can degenerate into 
unsatisfying pseudoempirical generalizations ("Even veterans of moral 
wars rarely set themselves the farsighted statesmanly task of assuring the 
peaceful conditions that would make their particular virtues obsolete" (p. 
301). And its literariness can cloy. For example she sometimes provides 
brief epigraphs that border on the silly ("Ethics without psychology is 
science fiction; morality without politics is a bicycle without wheels" (p. 
15). 
And some minor irritations: no index or cumulative bibliography. That 
makes a collection of fairly disjointed essays, like this one, especially 
difficult to work with. 
So, overall, a long and difficult book, sometimes rather dense, 
sometimes annoying-but also sometimes entertaining and insightful. As 
long as you know what you're getting into, I'd say, on the whole, it's worth 
looking into.1 
African Philosophy: The Essential Readings, by Tsenay Serequeberhan. 
New York: Paragon House, 1991. 250pp. $1355 (Paper). Reviewed by 
Clarence Shole* Johnson, Spelman College. 
If one is in search of a book that brings together the various kinds of 
issues that inform questions about the existence and nature of African 
philosophy, then this book is certainly it. There are eleven thought-
provoking, insightful, polemical and well-written essays in the book, each 
attempting to answer the question "What is African philosophy?" And the 
polemic in the essays is decisive evidence that Africans are not (and should 
not be expected to be) a monolithic group. 
Roughly, there are three competing responses to the question. First, is 
the view of the ethnophilosophers, according to which African 
philosophy is a documentation of the ideas implicit in the folklores, tales, 
myths and religious beliefs of various African ethnic groups such as the 
Bantus or the Yorubas. Second, is the position called philosophic sagacity 
which suggests that African philosophy is a critique of traditional African 
beliefs undertaken by individual African sages (or wise men) within the 
tradition. And third, we have the views of the professional (i.e.Western 
trained) African philosophers. This group, being mainly college and 
university teachers, views African philosophy as the engagement by 
Africans in the analysis of the kind of issues addressed in the curricula of 
1 Thanks to Kelly Rogers for helpful comments. 
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institutions of higher learning, especially in the West; moreover, these 
African philosophers should utilize their analytical skills in the 
investigation of African belief systems. In what follows I will discuss a 
few representative samples of these positions. 
In his paper "Is there an African Philosophy?" (ch. 1), Innocent 
Onyewuenyi, taking his point of departure from the ubiquitous Bantu 
Philosophy of Placide Temples, defends the view that African philosophy 
is a documentation of the beliefs held by Africans. He argues that Africans 
have a concept of ontology encapsulated in the idea that there are 
different forces, the greatest of which is God; that there is an African 
ethics; and that there is an African epistemology according to which 
"Knowledge or wisdom for the African consists in how deeply he 
understands the nature of forces and their interaction" (pp. 40-41). 
Onyewuenyi's position is a reaction to the once (and perhaps still) 
generally held view in the West, most blatantly expressed by such 
philosophers as Locke, Hume, Kant, Hegel etc., that Africans, and in 
general all non-Europeans, are inherently devoid of the capacity to reason, 
a capacity that is manifested in the employment of argumentation and 
dialectic especially on speculative matters. In his introductory remarks, 
Serequeberhan outlines this view as follows: 
Hume and Kant held the view that Africans, in virtue of 
their blackness, are precluded from the realm of reason 
and civilization. As Hume puts it, "I am apt to suspect 
the negroes, and in general all other species of men (for 
there are four of five different kinds) to be naturally 
inferior to whites. There never was a civilized 
complexion than white." Kant, in agreement with Hume, 
asserts that "[so] fundamental is the difference between 
the two races of men, and it appears to be as great in 
regard to mental capacities as in color." Making a subtle 
observation on the intellectual capacities of a black 
person, Kant astutely remarks that "this fellow was 
quite black from head to foot, a clear proof that what he 
said was stupid" (pp. 5-6). 
From this kind of view, it is obvious that Africans are deemed to be 
inherently incapable of undertaking philosophic inquiry, indeed of having 
a philosophy at all. And it is to views of this kind and their implications 
for the question about the existence of philosophy in traditional Africa 
that Onyewuenyi is responding in his paper. One limitation on 
Onyewuenyi's position, however, is that it glorifies the traditional elders 
as the bastion of insight, wisdom and knowledge, and blames the turbulent 
socio-political realities of present-day Africa singularly on the 
colonialists. He charges that the colonial administrators "regarded the 
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educated as the wise people, and consequently and arbitrarily appointed 
them as legislators and leaders in the community, contrary to African 
political philosophy, which took the eldest of the community, to be, by 
divine law, the repository of wisdom and the link between God, the 
ancestors, and the living" (p. 42). But Onyewuenyi fails to note that 
traditional African society as embodied in the elders shows an antipathy 
toward criticism and is repressive. This repressiveness partly explains the 
ease with which the colonial administration was able to create dissention. 
One needs only to read passages from Achebe's Things Fall Apart to see 
this. Okonkwo's only son readily joined the missionaries because he could 
no longer endure the pain of repression. But it does not follow from an 
admission of the society's repressiveness that criticism does not at all take 
place. (Consider Obierika's questioning the beliefs of his Ibo society, 
beliefs the subscription to which brings nothing but calamity to the group. 
This is a silent criticism of traditional Ibo life.) In his endeavour to present 
the case for the existence of a traditional African philosophy in the sense 
denied by the West, Onyewuenyi fails to bring up the real issue that would 
have constituted an appropriate refutation of the view that African 
traditional society is pre-rational, pre-critical, and therefore 
pre-philosophical. 
To show that, however scantily, traditional African society does 
engage in philosophic activity is the object of Henry Oruka's paper, 
"Sagacity in Africa" (ch. 2). To begin, Oruka distinguishes between culture 
philosophy and philosophic sagacity. Culture philosophy consists of the 
beliefs that are communally owned and shared, beliefs that are 
uncritically accepted and subscribed to by everyone in the community. The 
custodians of these beliefs are the elders (sages) in the society. According 
to Oruka, these elders are therefore sagacious in respect of the society's 
beliefs and customs. But, Oruka argues, their sagacity is cultural and not 
philosophic. It is cultural only in the sense that the elders are the 
repositories of knowledge about the society's customs. 
What then is philosophic sagacity? Oruka takes philosophic 
sagacity to be a critique of culture philosophy, a critique by an individual 
sage within the society of the society's customs and beliefs. This 
individual may or may not be recognized as a sage, but he does examine the 
customs and beliefs of the society. As Oruka puts it, philosophic sagacity 
is "a product and a reflective reevaluation of the culture philosophy." It 
involves a "critical assessment" of a culture and its underlying beliefs" 
using "the power of reason rather than the celebrated beliefs of communal 
consensus and explanation" (p. 52, emphasis in text). 
Note that the motivation for philosophic sagacity is similar to that 
of ethnophilosophy of the kind advocated by Onyewueni, viz., to disprove 
the claims of Western scholars that Africans are devoid of the power of 
reason to think coherently, logically and speculatively. Of importance, 
however, is the parallel that Oruka draws between the origination of 
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Greek philosophy and that of philosophic sagacity. In Western 
philosophy, Thales is celebrated as the first philosopher because of his 
repudiation and substitution of the mythopaeic systems of ancient Greece 
with rational inquiry. Oruka, by describing philosophic sagacity as a 
critical rebellion against culture philosophy, is canvassing the idea that 
African philosophical systems have a similar origin with Western, and 
generally all, philosophical systems, namely a critique of antecedent or 
contemporary systems of thought. 
It would be off the mark to counter Oruka's position by asking him to 
identify or produce an African counterpart to, say, Thales or Socrates. The 
reason is that philosophy in traditional Africa is not practiced as a 
systematic and organized activity as in the West. But, again, it does not 
follow from this that philosophic activity does not take place. The 
objection will therefore be missing Oruka's point. Indeed, the approach of 
some contemporary professional African philosophers in seeking out and 
conducting interviews with individual sages is precisely aimed at 
documenting the existence of philosophers in traditional Africa although 
there are no philosophic schools as in the West. 
Contra Oruka, however, both Peter O. Bodunrin ("The Question of 
African Philosophy"), with whom Oruka takes issue, and Kwasi Wiredu 
("On Defining African Philosophy"), question the existence of a 
philosophical enterprise in tiaditional Africa. Bodurin, for example, 
contends that traditional African pithy sayings, folklore and myths, 
though rational, are anything but philosophic. The ideas embedded in 
these sayings etc. are group-owned; they are not presented and defended 
with arguments but instead are uncritically accepted by everyone in the 
community. Furthermore, Bodunrin charges that philosophic sagacity 
cannot be sustained because traditional African society is non-literate 
while philosophical activity requires literacy (p. 82). Consequently, he 
thinks that the object of contemporary African philosophy (and the role of 
the professional African philosopher) is to take a critical look at the 
concepts, beliefs and cultural systems of the society in a bid to seek out that 
which will reveal Africans as members of the world rather than as 
peculiar beings with peculiar ways as per the representations of 
ethnophilosophers. However, inasmuch as one applauds Bodunrin's 
argument for the universality and univocality of philosophical enterprise, 
his claim that literacy is a pre-requisite for philosophical activity is 
certainly false and is therefore justifiably rejected by Oruka (pp. 58-59) 
and also by Lansana Keita in "Contemporary African Philosophy: The 
Search for a Method" (ch. 7). Recall my observation about Obierika's silent 
criticism of Ibo beliefs. Obierika is an illiterate old man. 
But a paradoxical even if scathing indictment of ethnophilosophy 
from the standpoint of the professional African philosopher is Paulin J . 
Hountondji's "African Philosophy: Myth and Reality" (ch. 6). In a tone 
reminiscent of Quine's invective against the two dogmas of empiricism in 
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the article by that title, Hountondji charges that ethnophilosophy is a 
fraudulent discipline that simply masquerades as a science. And to justify 
its existence as a science, ethnophilosophy posits "the myth of primitive 
unanimity" (p. 117) that Africans en masse subscribe to a collective system 
of beliefs and as such are monolithic in thinking. This myth is reflected in 
a host of works by the likes of Europeans such as Temples, Marcel Griaule, 
Dominique Zahan, Louis-Vincent Thomas, and their uncritical African 
cohorts such as Leopold Sedar Senghor of the Senegal, Alexis Kagame of 
Rwanda, and William Abraham of Ghana, to name just a few. 
Hountondji stops short of describing both the rationale for 
ethnophilosophy and Western reaction to it as racist. But he need not 
engage in any name-calling to convey this thought. Quoting approvingly 
the pejorative remarks of Henry Oruka in which the latter denigrates 
ethnophilosophy, Hountondji calls attention to the condescension and 
patronizing attitude that informs studies and issues pertaining to Africa. I 
cannot help reproducing the entire passage. 
What may be a superstition is paraded as 'African 
religion', and the white world is expected to endorse that 
it is indeed a religion but an African religion. What in 
all cases is a mythology is paraded as 'African 
philosophy', and again the white culture is expected to 
endorse that it is indeed a philosophy but an African 
philosophy. What is in all cases a dictatorship is 
paraded as 'African democracy', and the white culture is 
again expected to endorse that it is so. And what is 
clearly a de-development or pseudo-development is 
described as 'development', and again the white world is 
expected to endorse that it is development —but of course 
'African development.' (p. 116). 
This passage aptly summarizes the reason professional African 
philosophers, and indeed philosophers of African descent, are justifiably 
hostile to ethnophilosophy. 
After such firebrand remarks of Hountondji, one naturally expects him 
to reject as absolutely preposterous the concept of an African philosophy, 
especially from the ethnophilosophic standpoint. But such expectation is 
severely thwarted by Hountondji's baffling re-definition of African 
philosophy as a critique of African beliefs and non-African (or Western) 
philosophy undertaken by Africans alone. In this regard, as he says, "A 
work like Bantu Philosophy does not belong to African philosophy, since 
its author [the Belgian, Placide Temples] is not African; but Kagame's work 
is an integral part of African philosophical literature" (p. 121). 
Hountondji fails to see the logical incoherence of his position when he 
expands the concept of African philosophy to include "all research into 
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Western philosophy carried out by Africans" (p. 122) while maintaining 
that works of non- African ethnophilosophers do not belong to the African 
philosophical corpus. Strangely enough, Hountondji claims that his 
position is not contradictory! But certainly the reader will think 
otherwise. 
Regrettably, I cannot comment on the remaining fine pieces in this 
volume. However, two that surely deserve brief mention are Kwasi 
Wiredu's already-noted "On Defining African Philosophy" and Lansana 
Keita's "Contemporary African Philosophy: The Search For A Method." A 
member of the professional philosophic school, Wiredu suggests that the 
definition of African philosophy must be answered with a programme— 
although it is not quite clear to me, at least, what programme he is really 
recommending. Nevertheless, the insights in his discussion are worth 
noting. And, finally, Lansana Keita reviews the other positions already 
discussed and attempts to counter the idea that literacy is a recent 
phenomenon in Africa by tracing the foundation of African philosophy to 
"the literate ideas of Egyptian thought and Medieval Africa" (p. 143, 
emphasis added). It is an open question, though, whether or not Keita's 
account of the history of literacy in Africa will sit well with many African 
scholars. Keita then suggests that philosophical activity in contemporary 
Africa must have a pragmatic goal, that of providing a theoretical 
analysis of the problems and issues that affect Africa in the hope of 
offering practical solutions to those problems. 
From the discussion I have provided thus far, it should be clear that 
the issues examined are far from resolved. The plethora of positions on the 
subject of African philosophy brings to mind the diversity of positions that 
were adopted in early critiques of African literature. One consequence of 
the discussion in the book is that it will undoubtedly force philosophers at 
large. Western and non-Western, to re-examine the concept of philosophy 
itself. Going beyond philosophy, however, the discussion will certainly 
interest those engaged in Black Studies, for it examines the philosophical 
underpinnings of the issues raised in Black Studies. To that end I should 
call attention to a short but impressive bibliography which the book 
provides. 
